


TAB

ACDA/DOS declassification & release instructions on file



SECRET/SENSITIVE
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

Noted by DC 2
8/16/74

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

August 14, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM E. COLBY
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Subject: MBFR Verification - German Views

Several months ago you and I agreed on the desirability of providing for negotiated verification arrangements in MBFR. Such arrangements might include limited entry points for the forces on each side, with observation posts at these points, and perhaps certain mobile teams. Obviously, we are a long way from negotiated verification arrangements with the Soviets in Vienna -- if we ever get there. Nonetheless, in the meantime we should not foreclose our chances for some negotiated verification arrangements.

As I mentioned to you before, a sensible Allied position has not been agreed to because of German resistance. The political types in Bonn are most sensitive about the political implications of negotiated verification: that they could symbolize an inferior status for Germany. To fight us on this issue, their representatives in Brussels are arguing that we first ought to discuss national technical means, and determine just how much negotiated verification is needed over and beyond NTM. Those people in Bonn who know better should know that NTM is not quite the answer for MBFR verification, and that negotiated arrangements could gain a great deal from the FRG point of view, particularly in helping to authenticate a violation so as to facilitate a timely NATO response.

Classified by FCI
Exempt GDS EO 11652.
Exempt. category 3

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- 2 -

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Since the Germans will come here for MBFR discussions late in August and again in late September, [REDACTED]

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Fred C. Ikle
Fred C. Ikle

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